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The natural and social worlds (and their interconnections) are far too complex to be 
understood in all their complexity in real time and to be governed in all their 
complexity in real time. This pair of statements is too simple: complexity is complex. 
This is reflected in the tendency for complexity to become a chaotic concept – 
especially in the social sciences, where mathematical formalization is difficult and 
metaphorical expression is common. Thus I must first reduce the complexity of 
complexity in order to connect it to problems of governance and meta-governance. 
Indeed, faced with complexity, simplification is essential for any operating system or 
agent to be able to ‘go on’ in the world. Ontological complexity enforces selection on 
natural and social systems alike. One way to study such systems is in terms of how 
they select selections. In the social world, complexity is reduced in two main ways. 
The first is simplification through semiosis (meaning- or sense-making), which is 
associated with specific systems of meaning and forms of representation and tied to 
personal and collective identities. The second is simplification through various 
modes of structuration, which set limits to action repertoires and compossible sets of 
social relations in time-space, and through attempts to articulate (collibrate) different 
forms of structuration. Governance is relevant in both respects: its success depends 
on the adequacy of social imaginaries to the complexities of the real world and on 
the relevance of the modes of governance to the objects that are to be governed. 
Given these remarks, my contribution to this special issue of Zarządzanie Publiczne 
will undertake five tasks: (1) present the key concepts for an analysis of complexity 
and its reduction through semiosis and structuration; (2) elaborate the notions of 
lived experience (tied to personal identity or consciousness), social imaginary, and 
ideology (which involves more than social imaginaries); (3) introduce the key 
concepts for the study of structuration, including spatio-temporal fix, structural 
coupling, and ecological dominance; (4) introduce the notion of learning as a crucial 
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mediation between lived experience and social structuration; and (5) show how 
different forms of coordination of complex interdependence have developed to 
address these problems, how they fail, and how individual and social agents seek to 
address governance failure through new forms of imaginary and new efforts at 
collibration. My contribution ends with some remarks on a research agenda based 
on these arguments and a practical agenda oriented to better governance based on 
‘romantic public irony’ as a way of ‘going on’ in a deeply complex world. 
1. Complexity and its Reduction 
John Urry (2002) suggests that sociological hypotheses about the real world are 
generated through metaphor and that, as the real world changes, sociologists should 
adopt new metaphors. Ignoring the seeming contradiction in this account and the risk 
that metaphors are used to tell ‘good stories’ rather than provide ‘solid arguments’, 
we can certainly agree that recent interest in complexity reflects a Zeitdiagnostik – 
right or wrong – that the social world has become more complex. This, in turn, has 
led social agents to search for new ways of reducing complexity and addressing its 
problems. Among the many reasons recently advanced for a dramatic intensification 
of societal complexity are: 
• increased functional differentiation combined with increased interdependence 
among functional systems; 
• increased fuzziness, contestability, and de-differentiation of institutional 
boundaries; 
• increased complexity of spatial and scalar relations and horizons of action as 
national economies, national states, and national societies cease to be the 
main axes and reference points in societal organization; 
• increased complexity and interconnectedness of temporalities and temporal 
horizons, ranging from split-second timing (e.g., computer-driven trading) to an 
acceleration of the glacial time of social and environmental change; 
• multiplication of identities and the imagined communities to which different 
social forces orient their actions and seek to coordinate them; 




• the self-potentiating nature of complexity, whereby complex systems generally 
operate in ways that create opportunities for additional complexity. 
But recognition of growing social complexity, even assuming that this could be 
measured accurately and compared with earlier periods and/or across different kinds 
of societies in today’s asynchronous, unevenly developing world society, does not, 
per se, justify the appropriation of models of complexity from mathematics and the 
natural sciences without regard to the differences between the natural and social 
worlds. In particular, it ignores the meaningfulness of the social world and the scope 
for agents to respond reflexively to complexity (for the counter-view that perception, 
boundary-drawing, and meaning-making occur in all systems, see Barbieri 2008). 
This suggests that we should distinguish complexity in general from specific modes 
of complexity. All complex systems share some features – or, at least for the sake of 
reducing the complexity of complexity, it makes sense to identify these features. 
These include non-linearity, scale dependence, recursiveness, sensitivity to initial 
conditions, and feedback. Even at this level of analysis, however, complexity can be 
studied in many ways, including algorithmic, deterministic, and aggregative analyses 
(Rescher 1998). While some complex systems can be modeled more or less 
adequately for given purposes, others are characterized by ‘deep complexity’, i.e., 
are hard to reduce in a satisficing way and therefore pose problems about how to 
reduce this complexity (Delorme 2010). Social scientists must move on from 
'complexity in general' to study specific modes of complexity (and deep complexity) 
in the social world and their interaction with the natural world. Such study includes 
the governance of complexity and the complexity of governance (cf. Jessop 1997). 
One way to approach this task is through the tools of cultural political economy 
(Jessop 2004, 2009; Jessop and Sum 2001; Sum and Jessop 2013). This studies 
semiosis and structuration as essential mechanisms of complexity reduction in the 
field of political economy but, as I demonstrate below, its approach can be 
generalized to all social relations. These mechanisms are potentially complementary 
but possibly contrary or disconnected. For social agents to be able to ‘go on’ in the 
world, they must reduce complexity by selectively attributing meaning to some of its 
features rather than others and also set limits to compossible sets of social relations 
through processes of structuration. Thus actors (and observers) must focus 
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selectively on some aspects of the world as the basis for becoming active 
participants therein and/or for describing and interpreting it as disinterested 
observers. These ‘aspects’ are not objectively pre-given in the real world nor are 
they subjectively pre-scripted by hard-wired cognitive capacities. Instead they 
depend for their selective apperception (recognition and misrecognition) in large part 
on the currently prevailing meaning systems of relevant actors and observers as 
these have been modified over time. In turn, meaning-making helps to shape the 
overall constitution of the natural and social world insofar as it guides a critical mass 
of self-confirming, path-shaping actions that more or less correctly diagnose the 
scope for the world to be different and therefore contribute to realizing what was 
previously there only in potentia. 
A recent illustration of the importance of complexity reduction (and its limitations) is 
the well-known confession by Alan Greenspan, Chair of the U.S. Federal Reserve 
(1987-2006). Asked by Representative Henry Waxman whether he thought that his 
ideology had pushed him into making decisions that he had since come to regret in 
the light of the continuing financial crisis, he replied: 
‘remember what an ideology is: a conceptual framework for people to deal 
with reality. Everyone has one. You have to – to exist, you need an ideology. 
The question is whether it is accurate or not. ... I’ve found a flaw. I don’t know 
how significant or permanent it is. But I’ve been very distressed by that fact ...  
A flaw in the model that I perceived as the critical functioning structure that 
defines how the world works, so to speak.’ (Congressional Hearing, 23.10.08)  
This ideology was the efficient market hypothesis, a key element in neo-classical 
economics, and the basis of his conviction that markets could and, indeed, should be 
left to manage themselves. If necessary, the state would step in later to clear up any 
problems. Of course, there are many other economic ‘ideologies’ or, as I prefer to 
call them, ‘imaginaries’, which simplify economic relations in different ways. And 
there are countless other ways of reducing complexity through sense-making that 
attribute meaning to other aspects of the natural and social world, construing them in 
one or another way in a this-worldly and/or other-worldly fashion. The latter would 
include, for example, spiritual and religious imaginaries. 
But, while all social construals are equal (insofar as all social agents must engage in 
meaning-making in order to be able to ‘go on’ in the world), some interpretations are 
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more equal than others in their impact on the social construction of the social world. 
The role of intellectuals is clearly important here but we should not fall prey to the 
intellectuals’ temptation to think that theirs are the only imaginaries that become 
hegemonic or dominant. The role of semiosis in this respect cannot be understood or 
explained without identifying and exploring the extra-semiotic conditions that both 
enable meaning-making and make it more or less effective not only in terms of 
comprehension but also in terms of practical action. This highlights the role of 
variation, selection, and retention in the development and consolidation of some 
construals rather than others and in their embodiment and embedding in practices 
that transform the natural and social world. As one moves from variation through 
selection to retention, extra-semiotic factors linked to specific communication 
channels and broader social configurations play an increasing role in determining 
which discourses or imaginaries are translated into durable social constructions and 
become part of actors’ bodily and mental condition (hexis), shape their personal and 
social identities, promote certain social dispositions and routines (habitus), get 
enacted in organizational routines, or become institutionalized in various ways. 
Inquiring into such processes is especially important where meaning systems have 
become so sedimented (taken-for-granted or naturalized) that their socially 
contingent nature goes unremarked. Another intriguing question concerns the 
relation between micro-social diversity and stable macro-social configurations and 
this is where structuration enters the investigation. 
Structuration establishes possible connections and sequences of social interaction 
(including interaction with natural worlds) that facilitate routine actions and set limits 
to path-shaping strategic actions. While structuration refers to a complex, contingent, 
tendential process that is mediated through action but produces results that no 
actors can be said to have willed, structure refers to the contingently necessary 
outcome of diverse structuration efforts (for an influential sociological account of 
structuration, see Giddens 1984; for a more complicated interpretation, with a more 
nuanced analysis of structure-agency dialectics, see Jessop 2009). With its mix of 
constrained opportunities, recursiveness, redundancy, and flexibility, structuration 
facilitates social reproduction somewhere between an impossible stasis and the 
edge of chaos. Reproduction is not automatic but is mediated through situated social 
action that occurs in more or less structured contexts. It involves complex 
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assemblages of asymmetrical opportunities for social action, privileging some actors 
over others, some identities over others, some ideal and material interests over 
others, some spatio-temporal horizons of action over others, some coalition 
possibilities over others, some strategies over others and so on (Jessop 2009). In 
this sense, structural constraints always operate selectively: they are not absolute 
and unconditional but always temporally, spatially, agency-, and strategy-specific. 
Conversely, to the extent that agents are reflexive, capable of reformulating within 
limits their own identities and interests, and able to engage in strategic calculation 
about their current situation, they may be able to alter these selectivities. 
Where these two forms of complexity reduction complement each other, they 
transform meaningless and unstructured complexity into meaningful and structured 
complexity. In terms of societal configurations, this involves hegemonic imaginaries 
and institutional and spatio-temporal fixes that together produce zones of relative 
stability based on active or, more likely, passive consent and structured coherence 
(Section 3). The social and natural world becomes relatively meaningful and orderly 
for actors (and observers) in so far as not all possible social interactions are 
compossible in a given time-space envelope. This excludes many other meanings 
and many other possible social worlds. This does not prevent competing imaginaries 
concerning different fields of social action or, indeed, rival principles of societal 
organization more generally. For, in a social world characterized by exploitation, 
oppression, and exclusion, there are many possible standpoints for construing the 
world and many sources of social disruption. How relatively stable social orders 
emerge in particular time-space envelopes in the face of such complexity is one of 
the enduring challenges in the social sciences. 
2. Lived Experience, Social Imaginaries, and Ideologies 
Semiosis is an umbrella concept for all forms of the production of meaning that is 
oriented to communication among social agents, individual or collective. An 
imaginary is a semiotic ensemble (without tightly defined boundaries) that frames 
individual subjects’ lived experience of an inordinately complex world and/or guides 
collective calculation about that world. There are many such imaginaries and they 
are involved in complex and tangled relations at different sites and scales of action 
(see Althusser 1971; Taylor 2001). As noted above, without them, individuals cannot 
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‘go on’ in the world and collective actors (such as organizations) could not relate to 
their environments, make decisions, or pursue more or less coherent and successful 
strategies in a complex, often deeply complex, environment. 
While some social imaginaries are organized around (oriented to, help to construct) 
specific systems of action (e.g., economy, law, science, education, politics, health, 
religion, art), others are more concerned with different spheres of life, the ‘lifeworld’ 
(broadly interpreted) or ‘civil society’. The latter kind of imaginaries may nonetheless 
acquire system-relevance through their articulation into the operation of system 
logics (e.g., the use of gender to segment the labour force, the mobilization of ‘racial’ 
identities to justify educational exclusion). System-relevant and lifeworld imaginaries 
provide the basis for identities and interests, whether individual, group, movement, or 
organizational. Agents normally have multiple identities, privileging some over others 
in different contexts. This has prompted the recent interest in ‘intersectionalism’, i.e., 
the study of the effects of different mixes of system-relevant and ‘lifeworld’ identities. 
Given this multiplicity of identities, their differential intersection, and the problems 
that this poses for social mobilization, effective social agency often depends on 
strategic essentialism (Spivak 1987). This involves the discursive and practical 
privileging of one identity over others for the purposes of collective action in 
particular conjunctures even though this temporarily ignores or suppresses real 
differences within a movement. Examples include the appeal to nationalism in inter-
imperialist wars, successive waves of feminism, or the mobilization of regional 
identities to create the social as well as economic bases of regional competitiveness. 
Everyone is involved in social construal because meaning-making is the basis of 
lived experience. But not everyone makes an equal contribution to the social 
construction of social relations. Each system and the different spheres of the 
‘lifeworld’ have their own semiotic divisions of labour that overlay, differentially draw 
on, and feed into lived experience. Some individuals and/or collective intellectuals 
(such as political parties and old and new social movements) are particularly active 
in bridging these different systems and spheres of life, attempting to create 
hegemonic meaning systems or to develop sub- or counter-hegemonic imaginaries. 
And, of course, increasingly, semiosis is heavily ‘mediatized’, i.e., influenced by 
mass media and social media. Given the diversity of systems and the plurality of 
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identities in the ‘lifeworld’, it would be mistaken to assume that one type of social 
actor will be the leading force in semiosis in general or hegemony-making in 
particular. Likewise, given competing societalization principles, there can be no 
guarantee that one principle of structuration will dominate the others. 
What is the relation between lived experience, social imaginaries, and ideology? We 
should not short-circuit the analysis and move from semiosis to ideology too hastily. 
At stake in a serious ideological critique are the sources and mechanisms that ‘bias’ 
lived experience and imaginaries towards specific identities and their changing ideal 
and/or material interests in specific conjunctures. The ‘raw material’ of ideology is 
meaning systems, social imaginaries, and lived experience. However, these are all 
essential aspects of actors’ ability to ‘go on’ in world in the face of complexity. They 
 
Table 1 Imaginary versus Ideology 
Imaginary Ideology 
Not ‘true’ or ‘false’ but may be more or 
less adequate for ‘going on’ in the world 
Ideology is linked to ‘truth regimes’ that 
privilege ideal and/or material interests 
Can lead to learning based on reflexive 
interpretation of successive experiences 
(Erlebnis  Erfahrung) 
Ideology frames and limits Erlebnis (lived 
experience) and the scope for Erfahrung 
(learning appropriate lessons) 
Plurality of imaginaries is based on 
different entry-points and standpoints 
Competing ideologies privilege some 
entry-points and standpoints over others 
Reflexive agents can adopt different 
perspectives to open space for varying 
degrees of self-reflexion 
Ideologies may be formed and promoted 
intentionally and, even when they are 
emergent, tend to block (self-)reflexion  
 
involve, wittingly or not, specific entry-points and standpoints to make the world 
calculable through selective observation of the real world, reliance on specific codes 
and programmes to interpret it, the deployment of particular categories and forms of 
calculation, sensitivity to specific structures of feeling, reference to particular 
identities, justification in terms of particular vocabularies of motives, efforts to 
calculate short- to long-term interests, and so forth. The term ‘social imaginary’ 
designates these simplifications and they are the basis for lived experience. 
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When analyzing meaning systems, then, the three main analytical steps required to 
avoid simplistic critiques of semiosis as always-already ideological are: (1) recognize 
the role of semiosis as a meaning (or meme) pool in complexity reduction, i.e., 
regard signs and symbols as elements from which ideation and communication 
draw; (2) identify social imaginaries, i.e., specific clusters of meaning (or semiotic) 
systems, and describe their form and content – recognizing that they are never fully 
closed and are frequently re-articulated; and (3) analyze their contingent articulation 
and contribution to processes of structuration that secure specific patterns of 
exploitation, oppression, and domination that serve the particular ideal or material 
interests of specific individual agents or social forces. 
3. Spatio-Temporal Fix, Structural Coupling, Ecological Dominance 
Structuration sets limits to compossible combinations of social relations and thereby 
renders them more predictable and manageable as objects of social action. Just as 
semiosis is not as such ideological in form, content, and effects, structuration does 
not necessarily entail exploitation, oppression, and domination. This is something 
that must be established through rigorous theoretical and empirical investigation 
and/or through learning based on attempts to transform specific sets of social 
relations. It is also important to note that there are always interstitial, residual, 
marginal, irrelevant, recalcitrant and plain contradictory semiotic and extra-semiotic 
elements that escape any attempt to identify, govern, and stabilize a given set of 
social arrangements or broader social order. While such elements can disrupt the 
smooth performance of instituted social orders and provide bases of resistance to 
the established order, they also offer a reservoir of semiotic and material resources 
that can be mobilized in the face of unexpected events or crisis (Grabher 1994). 
Three useful concepts for investigating structuration are spatio-temporal fix, 
structural coupling, and ecological dominance. A spatio-temporal fix (which is also 
social and institutional) emerges when the conditions for relative social order are 
secured within a given time-space envelope thanks to the displacement and/or 
deferral of sources of instability elsewhere and/or into the future. In other words, 
zones of relative stability are typically tied to zones of relative instability: these may 
develop by chance or, more often, through more or less deliberate efforts to secure 
stability at the expense of other places and/or future problems. Such fixes delimit the 
10 
 
main spatial and temporal boundaries within which structural coherence is secured, 
and externalize certain costs of securing this coherence beyond these boundaries. In 
this sense, however, zones of relative instability form the ‘constitutive outside’ of 
zones of relative stability. The risk of ‘blowback’ is therefore always present to a 
greater or lesser degree and, as we will see below, crises in governance are often 
related to the neglect of the ‘constitutive outside’ and its contribution to an always 
temporary, partial, and fragile governance regime. Even within these boundaries 
some classes, class fractions, social categories or other social forces located inside 
the relevant zone of relative stability are marginalized, excluded, or oppressed. 
Structural coupling refers to the ‘blind co-evolution’ of different sets of social relations 
resulting from their co-existence or interpenetration in the same time-space envelope 
and/or its ‘constitutive outside’. The construal of different institutional orders as more 
or less clearly demarcated from each other (e.g., markets and states) does not mean 
that they are separate in the real social world. On the contrary, they can be related in 
many complex and unpredictable ways that may in turn become factors in the failure 
of efforts to govern an ‘imagined’ economy (i.e., the subset of economic activities 
and their extra-economic conditions of existence that is identified as the basis for 
economic calculation, steering, management, etc.) because the effects of structural 
coupling go unrecognized and, for some actors, are even unimaginable (as shown 
by Alan Greenspan’s above-cited confession). Other examples of failure to govern 
‘imagined’ sets of social relations (e.g., the family, youth culture, migration, health, 
anthropogenic climate change, industrial relations, fiscal crisis, sovereign debt, etc.) 
may be explicable in similar terms. Structural coupling should not be confused with 
attempts to engage in the strategic coordination of different sets of social relations 
(see Section 5), although such attempts may seek to rely on structural coupling to 
produce their effects and, as noted, in failing fully to anticipate them, fail. 
Finally, ecological dominance refers to the relative importance of different instituted 
social orders (economic, legal, military, political, religious, educational, scientific, 
etc.) as problem-makers and problem-takers in the social ecology formed by the co-
existence and structural coupling of different self-organizing social orders. Whereas 
orthodox Marxism suggests that the economy (more precisely, the dominant social 
relations of production) are determinant in the last instance, the concept of ecological 
dominance allows for different sets of social relations to be primary in different 
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periods or specific conjunctures. In this respect, the principal obstacles to effective 
governance will derive from the structural contradictions and strategic dilemmas that 
are associated with the ecologically dominant set of social relations. These could be 
the contradictions of the capital relation and the dilemmas that they generate for 
social forces in particular contexts. But they could be the contradictions involved in 
civil-military relations when armed conflict is the chief problem-maker and the 
dilemmas this poses around accountability to citizens through elected government 
and the centralization involved in military command structures. No doubt readers can 
think of other examples. This has important implications for the adequacy of different 
social imaginaries as bases for governance as well as for the adequacy of different 
approaches to governance in particular periods and conjunctures. 
4. How Learning Mediates Lived Experience and Structuration 
Learning has the same selectivities (semiotic, structural, technological, and agential) 
as semiosis more generally and also undergoes variation, selection, and retention. 
Learning depends on a dialectics of Erlebnis (immediate experience) and Erfahrung 
(lessons learnt) that has its own temporalities. I suggest that learning is an important 
bridge between semiosis and structuration in so far as it results from the interaction 
of more or less reflexive, sense-making social agents with a complex natural and 
social world that is not fully, let alone immediately, accessible to observation and 
comprehension. It is in this sense that one can talk of a ‘unity of theory and practice’ 
or, better, of expectations based on instituted or emerging social imaginaries and 
personal or collective experience based on attempts to ‘go on’ in the natural and 
social world through practical action. I will explore the relevance of this dialectic to 
governance in the next section. But first I want to show how learning operates in the 
face of shocks to social imaginaries (Greenspan’s ‘ideologies’) that result from the 
profoundly disorienting impact of crises that are unexpected, even unimaginable, and 
that render established crisis-management routines ineffective or inoperable. In 
adopting this line of investigation into learning, I do not suggest that learning occurs 
only in crisis or that crisis always produces learning. But crises do provide interesting 
insights into the more general mechanisms of learning as a potential bridge between 
sense-making and structuration. 
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When crises throw established modes of learning into crisis, learning can pass 
through three stages: learning in crisis, learning about crisis, and learning from crisis 
(Ji 1996; Jessop 2013). Each stage is likely to involve different balances of semiosis 
and structuration as well as different degrees of reflexivity, i.e., learning about 
learning. The latter occurs when actors believe that new imaginaries are needed 
because inherited approaches have not worked well and therefore reorganize 
information collection, calculation, and embodied and/or collective memory. Shifts in 
strategic learning and knowledge production often require a shift in the balance of 
forces in wider social relations. 
Crises of crisis-management are especially likely to disrupt learnt strategic behaviour 
and lead to an initial trial-and-error ‘muddling-through’ approach. Learning in crisis 
occurs in the immediacy of experiencing crisis, considered as a moment of profound 
disorientation, and is oriented to the phenomenal forms of crisis. It involves attempts 
to make sense of an initial disorientation (at some level of everyday life, 
organizational and/or institutional and/or policy paradigms, disciplinary or theoretical 
framing, and meta-narrative) in order to ‘go on’ in the face of the crisis as it is 
experienced (Erlebnis). Three points merit attention here. First, social actors have 
different social, spatial, and temporal positions as well as reflexive capacities and 
past and will live the crisis in different ways. In this sense, actors’ strategic learning 
does not come directly from the crisis as a whole, but from their own circumstances 
and crisis experiences. This can lead to different strategic responses (strategic 
variation); and their results vary in terms of success or survival under certain 
structural and conjunctural conditions (strategic selection). Second, actors vary in 
their capacities to ‘read’ the crisis and to respond to it in the ‘short-term’. At one 
extreme we find wilful blindness or repeated bouts of ‘crying wolf’ that lead to the 
dismissal of real crises; at the other extreme, crises may be manufactured (or crisis-
construals may be deliberately biased) to force decisions favourable to one’s own 
interests. Lastly, in critical realist terms, learning in crisis is more likely to address the 
empirical and actual dimensions of the crisis than to deal with its real causes 
(especially in terms of their spatio-temporal breadth and depth). 
Learning about crisis occurs as a crisis unfolds, often in unexpected ways, with lags 
in real time as actors begin to interpret the crisis in terms of underlying mechanisms 
and dynamics. It goes beyond the ‘phenomenal’ features of a crisis to its ‘essential’ 
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features in order to develop more effective initial responses and a more effective 
mid-term strategy. It is most likely where the routine crisis-management procedures 
adopted by actors prove, or seem to be, inadequate or inappropriate, with the result 
that policy-making and implementation must engage in experimentation. This stage 
differs from learning in crisis because it takes more time to dig beneath phenomenal 
features (if it did not, then this would not be a ‘crisis’ that is disorienting at the level of 
theoretical or policy paradigm and it would be possible to engage in routine crisis-
management routines) and/or to scan the environment for analogous events in past 
or present. Social actors learn through ‘trial-and-error’ in specific conditions and, in 
this sense, through ‘learning about crisis’ they also embark on learning from crisis. 
Learning from crisis occurs after a crisis is (temporarily) resolved (or changes its 
form, e.g., from liquidity crisis to sovereign debt crisis or fiscal crisis) and includes 
preventive or prudential actions to prevent repetition, to improve crisis-management 
routines, and so on. It may lead to revisions in imaginaries, whether these take the 
form of meta-narratives, theoretical frameworks, policy paradigms, or everyday 
expectations and routines. In this phase, strategic lessons are retained after the 
surviving social actors have had time to reflect on the new, post-crisis realities. Only 
then is overall strategic reorientation and path-breaking likely to be accomplished. 
Lessons from the past are often invoked in the course of all three learning types. 
This involves the use of history to make history or, put differently, the effort to define 
appropriate historical parallels as a basis for responding effectively to the crisis in 
real time. Such lessons often interact with ‘spatial’ dimensions, such as policy 
transfer across different fields, sites, levels, and scales of policy-making. 
5. (Meta-)Governance of Complexity and Complexity of (Meta-)Governance 
Interest in governance, theoretically and normatively, is linked to growing recognition 
(correctly or not) of the growing complexity of social life (Section 1). ‘Governance’ 
sometimes covers all possible modes of co-ordination of complex and reciprocally 
interdependent activities or operations. The most commonly identified modes of 
coordination are the anarchy of the market, imperative coordination, reflexive self-
organization, and solidarity. In each case, successful co-ordination depends on the 
performance of complementary activities and operations by other actors – whose 
pursuit of their activities and operations depends in turn on such activities and 
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operations being performed elsewhere in the relevant social ensemble. Sometimes 
the term refers mainly to reflexive self-organization. 
Interest in the latter mode of governance developed because it is alleged to integrate 
the phenomenon of complexity more explicitly, reflexively, and, it is hoped, effectively 
than reliance on markets or command. Indeed, far from just responding to demands 
from social forces dissatisfied with both state and market failure, state managers 
themselves have actively promoted these new forms of governance as adjuncts to 
and/or substitutes for more traditional forms of top-down government. They have 
done so in the hope and/or expectation that policy-making and implementation will 
thereby be improved in terms of efficiency, effectiveness, and transparency and also 
made more accountable to relevant stakeholders and/or moral standards, leading 
overall to ‘good governance’. This is reflected in growing concern with the role of 
various forms of political coordination which not only span the conventional public-
private divide but also involve 'tangled hierarchies', parallel power networks, or other 
forms of complex interdependence across different tiers of government and/or 
different functional domains. More generally, new forms of partnership, negotiation, 
and networking have been introduced or extended by state managers as they seek 
to cope with the declining legitimacy and/or effectiveness of other approaches to 
policy-making and implementation. Such innovations also redraw the inherited 
public-private divide, engender new forms of interpenetration between the political 
system and other functional systems, and modify relations between these systems 
and the lifeworld as the latter impacts upon the nature and exercise of state power. 
Nonetheless, self-reflexive organization also fails. Among the reasons for this are the 
inadequacy of the definition of the object(s) of governance, the general turbulence of 
environment, the time required for continuing dialogue, the existence of competing 
governance projects for same object of governance, and the specific dilemmas in 
particular forms of governance arrangement. Recognition of this failure in the 1990s 
(following disillusion with the turn to ‘more market, less state’ in the preceding 
decade) was followed from the mid-1990s onwards by growing theoretical and 
practical interest in meta-governance (for a comprehensive review of the theoretical 
and policy literature on meta-governance, see Meuleman 2008). The latter has been 
defined as the organization of self-organization, the regulation of self-regulation, the 
steering of self-steering, the structuring of the game-like interaction within 
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governance networks, and interaction among actors to influence parameter changes 
to the overall system. In its most basic and general sense, used below, it denotes the 
governance of governance. This is reflected in attempts to redesign governance 
mechanisms and in the recurrent switching among different modes of governance 
(cf. Dunsire 1996). In all cases, despite significant differences between their 
respective modes of complexity reduction (which always and inevitably marginalizes 
some features essential to effective governance), the continuing excess or surplus of 
complexity – especially deep complexity -- is a major cause for failure. 
How is governance articulated to broader patterns of social domination? Foucault 
and his followers in the field of governmentality studies have studied questions of 
problem-definition, power asymmetries, and domination and explored the effects of 
specific modes of calculation, institutional assemblages, and social practices. This 
approach does not focus on the state, understood as a centralized locus of rule, but 
examines instead how programmes and practices of rule are applied in micro-
settings, including at the level of individual subjects. Such work has been productive 
approach in a period marked by a shift from government to governance. But it 
neglects the parallel shift from governance to meta-governance or, phrased 
differently, the role of statecraft understood as a complex art of government that 
encompasses the ‘governance of governance’ within and beyond the (changing) 
formal boundaries of the state (cf. Lemke 1997). 
A more satisfying answer to the question of how governance is articulated to broader 
patterns of social domination can be developed by drawing on Antonio Gramsci. He 
famously remarked that ‘the general notion of the State includes elements which 
need to be referred back to the notion of civil society (in the sense that one might say 
that the State = ‘political society + civil society’, in other words, hegemony armoured 
with coercion’)’ (Gramsci Q 6, § 88: 763-4). His approach to the state (at least in the 
‘West’) went beyond the traditional state-theoretical triplet of territory, apparatus, 
population, beyond a Weberian concern with imperative coordination, and beyond a 
Leninist reduction of the state to a repressive apparatus. Gramsci regarded the state 
as a complex social relation that articulates state and non-state institutions and 
practices around specific economic, political, and societal projects and strategies. 
‘Civil society’, understood as a domain of associations that are normally regarded as 
private, was critical to this analysis and much of his theoretical and political analysis 
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was devoted to the place of private institutions, organizations, and movements in the 
exercise of state power. However, in marked contrast to mainstream governance 
research, he linked these analyses directly to class analysis and the critique of 
domination. Thus he proposed that ‘the State is the entire complex of practical and 
theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its 
domination but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules 
(Gramsci Q 15, § 10: 1765). This account merits further development. 
Of particular interest here is how new forms of governance fit into the overall 
configuration of class power and political domination more generally. By analogy with 
Gramsci’s own definitions, I argue that ‘the state in its inclusive sense’ could also be 
defined as ‘government + governance in the shadow of hierarchy’. In these terms, 
state power involves not only the exercise of state capacities that belong specifically 
to the state (e.g., legal sovereignty, a constitutionalized monopoly of organized 
coercion, taxation powers); but also resort to practices of collibration, i.e., the 
rebalancing of different forms of governance within and beyond the state in the 
shadow of hierarchy. Collibration is more than a technical, problem-solving fix: it 
always involves specific objects, techniques, and subjects of governance and it is 
tied to the management of a wider ‘unstable equilibrium of compromise’. Indeed, it is 
typically conducted in the light of the ‘global’ (or most general) function of the state, 
i.e., maintaining social cohesion in a class-divided (or, better, socially-divided) social 
formation. In other words, governance and meta-governance cannot be reduced to 
questions of how to solve issues of a specific techno-economic, narrowly juridico-
political, tightly focused social administrative, or otherwise neatly framed problem. 
This is not only because of the material interconnections among different problem 
fields in a complex world but also because every governance (and, a fortiori, meta-
governance) practice has implications for the balance of forces. 
Generalizing his arguments, reflexive self-organization based on stakeholding or 
public-private partnerships can be seen as a form of ‘passive revolution’: as an 
attempt to absorb the energies and expertise of leading figures in subaltern groups 
and, indeed, of whole ‘stakeholder groups’; to defuse a loss of political legitimacy; to 
recuperate problems of government overload; to turn potential sources of resistance 
or obstruction into self-responsibilized agents of their own subordination; and to 
enhance the efficiencies of economic, political, and social domination through forms 
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of micro-management that penetrate into the pores of an increasingly complex social 
formation that is intransparent to any single point of observation, command, and 
control and that cannot be left to the invisible but benign hand of market forces. 
Given that all forms of governance fail, it is hardly surprising that meta-governance is 
also failure prone. This could lead to a fatalistic, passive resignation; a stoical, 
ritualistic approach; self-deluding denial and/or the spinning of failure as success; or 
cynical opportunism as some actors exit when ahead, leaving others to carry the 
costs. To avoid such outcomes, and building on the preceding sections of this 
contribution, four inter-related strategies can be recommended: 
(1) Establishing a common worldview (social imaginary) for individual action and 
stabilizing key players’ orientations, expectations, and rules of conduct. This 
permits a more systematic review and assessment of problems and potentials, 
resource availability and requirements, and the demands of negative and 
positive co-ordination. 
(2) Simplifying models and practices that reduce the perceived complexity of the 
world but have sufficient variety to be congruent with real world processes and 
to remain relevant to governance objectives. These models should simplify the 
world without neglecting significant side effects, interdependencies, and 
emerging problems.  
(3) Developing the capacity for dynamic interactive learning about various causal 
processes and forms of interdependence, attributions of responsibility and 
capacity for actions, and possibilities of co-ordination in a complex, turbulent 
environment. This is enhanced when actors can switch among modes of 
governance to facilitate more effective responses to internal and/or external 
turbulence. 
(4) Building methods for co-ordinating actions among social forces with different 
identities, interests, and meaning systems, over different spatio-temporal 
horizons, and over different domains of action. This depends on self-reflexive 
self-organization to sustain exchange, hierarchy, negotiation, or solidarity as 
well as on the nature of the co-ordination problems engendered by operating 
over different scales and time horizons. 
Enough has already been said here and elsewhere on the first condition. Regarding 
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the second, the need for flexible 'requisite variety' (with its informational, structural, 
and functional redundancies) is based on recognition that complexity excludes 
simple governance solutions. Instead, effective governance requires a combination 
of mechanisms and strategies oriented to the complexities of the object to be 
governed. Combining strategies and tactics reduces the likelihood of failure, enabling 
their re-balancing in the face of governance failure and turbulence in the governance 
environment (Meuleman 2008). Efforts to maintain requisite variety may seem 
inefficient in economizing terms because this introduces slack or waste. But, as 
noted above, it also provides major sources of flexibility in the face of failure. For, if 
every mode of economic and political co-ordination is failure-prone, if not failure-
laden, longer-term success in co-ordination depends on the capacity to switch 
modes as the limits of any one mode become evident. 
Third, complexity requires that reflexive observers recognize that they cannot fully 
understand what they are observing and must make contingency plans for the 
unexpected. This involves inquiring in the first instance into the material, social, and 
discursive construction of possible objects of governance and reflecting on why this 
rather than another object of governance is dominant, hegemonic, or naturalized. It 
requires thinking critically about the strategically selective implications of adopting 
one or another definition of a specific object of governance and its properties, and, a 
fortiori, of the choice of modes of governance, participants in the governance 
process, and so forth. Thus reflexivity involves the ability and commitment to uncover 
and make explicit one's intentions, projects, and actions, their conditions of 
possibility, and what would be an acceptable outcome in the case of incomplete 
success. It involves cultivating the ability to learn about them, critique them, and act 
on any lessons. Applied to meta-governance, this means comparing the effects of 
failure/inadequacies in markets, government, self-organization, and solidarity; and 
regularly re-assessing how far current actions are producing desired outcomes. This 
requires monitoring mechanisms, modulating mechanisms, and a willingness to re-
evaluate objectives. And it requires learning about how to learn reflexively. There is a 
general danger of infinite regress here, of course; but this can be limited provided 
that reflexivity is combined with the other two principles. 
Fourth, given 'the centrality of failure and the inevitability of incompleteness' (Malpas 
and Wickham 1995: 39), how should actors approach the likelihood of failure? The 
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intellectual and practical stance recommended here is that of ‘romantic public irony'. 
To defend this, I distinguish irony from four other responses to governance failure: 
fatalism, stoicism, denial, and cynicism (see above). In contrast to fatalists, stoics, 
those in denial, and cynics, ironists are sceptical and romantic. Recognizing the 
inevitable incompleteness of attempts at governance (whether through the market, 
imperative coordination, or reflexive self-organization), they adopt a satisficing 
approach. Ironists accept incompleteness and failure as essential features of social 
life but continue to act as if completeness and success were possible. The ironist 
must simplify a complex, contradictory, and changing reality in order to be able to act 
– knowing full well that any such simplification distorts reality and, worse, that such 
simplifying distortions can sometimes generate failure as well as enhance the 
chances of success. In short, even as they expect failure, they act as if they intend to 
succeed. Moreover, following the law of requisite variety, they must be prepared to 
change the modes of governance as appropriate. 
Complicating matters further, a ‘double irony’ is present in romantic public irony. The 
romantic public ironist recognizes the likelihood of failure but chooses to act on the 
assumption that success is still possible – thereby ‘thinking one thing and doing 
another’. And, faced with the likelihood of failure, a romantic public ironist chooses 
her mode of failure. One cannot choose to succeed completely and permanently in a 
complex world; but one can choose how to fail. This makes it imperative to choose 
wisely! Given the main alternatives (markets, imperative coordination, self-
organization, and solidarity) and what we know about how and why they fail, the best 
chance of reducing the likelihood of failure is to draw on the collective intelligence of 
stakeholders and other relevant partners in a form of participatory democracy. This 
does not exclude resort to other forms of coordination but it does require that the 
scope granted to the market mechanism, the exercise of formal authority, or 
solidarity is subject as far as possible to decision through forms of participatory 
governance that aim to balance efficiency, effectiveness, and democratic 
accountability. Key substantive outcomes to be added here include sustainable 
development, the prioritization of social justice, and respect for difference. In this 
sense, public romantic irony is the best mechanism for working out which modes of 
governance to resort to in particular situations and when collibration is required. It is 
not the only method to be adopted in all and every situation. 
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6. Closing Remarks in Guise of a Conclusion 
The preceding section indicates the importance of exploring the dialectic between 
the complexity of the real world, the manner in which the real world comes to be 
interpreted as complex, and the forms of complexity reduction based on semiosis, 
structuration, and on their interaction. In terms of a research agenda on (meta-) 
governance, the preceding remarks invite the following questions. First, given the 
inherent complexity of the real world, what role does semiosis (i.e., meaning-making) 
play in reducing complexity and, a fortiori, defining collective problems? This is a 
field where critical discourse analysis has much to offer not only in understanding the 
discursive framing or construction of social problems but also in Ideologiekritik. 
Second, given the inherent complexity of the real world, what role does structuration 
play in limiting compossible social relations? This set of issues is one where a 
strategic-relational approach to structurally-inscribed strategic selectivities and, a 
fortiori, to patterns of domination, has much to offer. Third, given the importance of 
disciplinary, normalizing, and regulatory practices in both regards, what specific 
modes of calculation and technologies of power/knowledge are involved in 
governance? There are some interesting and productive links here to Foucauldian 
analyses of governmentality and questions of power/knowledge relations. And, 
fourth, because of the lack of social closure in a hypercomplex, discursively 
contested, structurally underdetermined, and technically malleable world, what scope 
is there for social agency to make a difference? This is where questions of 
conjunctural analysis, strategic calculation, and social mobilization come into play. 
Finally, in terms of practical recommendations on governance and meta-governance, 
I have advocated a principled and pragmatic reliance on romantic public irony 
combined with participatory governance. This is the best means to optimize the 
governance of complexity because it recognizes the complexity of governance. It 
also subordinates the roles of market forces, top-down command (especially through 
the state), and solidarity (with its risk of localism and/or tribalism) to the overall logic 
of participatory governance. Thus, while some theorists of governance rightly 
emphasize that governance takes place in the shadow of hierarchy, this should be 
understood in terms of a democratically accountable, socially inclusive hierarchy 
organized around the problematic of responsible metagovernance rather than 
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unilateral and top-down command. This places issues of constitutional design at the 
heart of debates on the future of governance and metagovernance. 
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